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Comments and Casenotes
FURTHER ON FIVE YEARS VOLUNTARY SEPARATION AS GROUND FOR ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
Beck v. Beck'
Nichols v. Nichols'
In the first principal case the spouses had lived together
for 17 years when, in 1930, differences arose between them
as to the education of their son. The husband "left the
bed of his wife" and for the next six months slept in the
room of the son. At the end of the six months the wife
"left the house" and took up quarters elsewhere. Nine
years later she sued for absolute divorce on the ground
of five years' voluntary separation. The trial court dismissed the bill and the Court of Appeals affirmed, saying:
"The first abandonment was by the husband; the second
was the act of the wife. There is no evidence in the record
that the parties mutually agreed to live apart at any
time . . ."
In the second principal case the parties were both
"about seventy years old" when they were married in
1933, the husband was then a widower with eight adult
children living, and the wife was a spinster. Incompatibility soon was made manifest and, in June, 1936, a separation was discussed, and apparently agreed upon, to begin
as soon as the wife could be admitted to "the old ladies'
home" (the wife had sold the house she had occupied
prior to marriage). They continued to live in the same
house during the Summer of 1936 and neither did anything about getting the wife into the home. On October
18th, 1936, the husband left the common home, leaving
the wife with very little fuel or food and no means of
support. He had told her in August that he was going
to leave in October. On December 17, 1936, the wife sued
the husband for partial divorce, alleging abandonment and
desertion, and asking alimony pendente lite, which latter
(for some unexplained reason) was denied her. That
case is still pending. On October 22, 1941, the husband
filed the present suit for absolute divorce, alleging five
124 A. (2d) 295 (Md., 1942).
'30 A. (2d) 446 (Md., 1943).
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years' voluntary separation. The trial court granted the
divorce, the wife appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the bill to be dismissed.

I
These two cases are the most recent pronouncements
of the Court of Appeals under the five years' voluntary
separation ground for absolute divorce, enacted in 1937,
and first dealt with in the Campbell case,' which case was4
noted in an earlier treatment of the matter in the REVIEW.
Since the Campbell case and prior to the two cases under
review, the ground has had occasion to be involved in
four other cases in the Court of Appeals. These will be
discussed presently. Further treatment of the Campbell
case will be reserved until specific discussion of the two
cases under review, for they are best to be treated against
the background of that, the first and the most thoroughly
reasoned of the opinions handed down about this divorce
ground.
In Dotterweich v. Dotterweich5 the Court of Appeals
affirmed granting the husband an absolute divorce under
his bill which, as finally amended, alleged in the alternative6 that the wife had abandoned him more than three
years before (the statutory period is now eighteen months)
and that they had voluntarily lived apart for five years.
The Court of Appeals opinion put the granting of the
divorce on the ground of "constructive desertion and abandonment" by refusal to cohabit, and the brief opinion gave
no treatment at all to the five years' separation aspect of
the case.
The case of France v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. 7 contains the most thorough treatment of the five year separation ground since that of the Campbell case. The trial
court granted the husband the divorce on the five year
ground, but the Court of Appeals reversed (after the hus3Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 40; Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229,
198 A. 414, 116 A. L. R. 939 (1938).
'Note, Five Year8 Voluntary Separation as New Ground for Absolute
Divorce (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 357.
5174 Md. 697, 200 A. 523 (1938).
' While the case did not go into it, yet it suggests the question whether
a plaintiff can allege in the alternative abandonment and voluntary separation. On the other hand, if a plaintiff alleges one of these but not both,
and 'the bill is dismissed on the merits, may he later file a new suit on the
other ground, or is the dismissal of a bill for absolute divorce on one
ground res judicata that the plaintiff had no grounds for such divorce at
the time?
'176 Md. 306, 4 A. (2d) 717 (1939).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

band's death at the time the case was to be argued in the
Court of Appeals) finding both that the separation was not
voluntary as to the wife and that there had been hope of
reconciliation. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff
had the burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, no more, since the ground for divorce
involved no question of moral turpitude. In this case the
husband had procured passage for his wife to Europe, to
travel, and he, the husband, had apparently hoped that
the separation would be final. But the wife had not so
hoped, and had expected to return, although she found it
impossible to do so until later, inasmuch as the husband
did not furnish her the wherewithal.
The Court reiterated the doctrine, first expressed in the
Campbell case, that the separation need not be voluntary
as to both from the very beginning of the physical separation, but merely must be found to have been voluntary
as to both for five consecutive years. It was said that
"... it may begin at any time after the physical separation,
when the parties manifest agreement in a common intent
of not living together again, but in that case it must continue without interruption for five years from the time
of the agreement before either spouse is entitled to a divorce under the statute."8 However, it was found that
the separation had never been voluntary as to the wife.
In Miller v. Miller9 the wife sued the husband for
absolute divorce, alleging more than three years' desertion and abandonment, and the husband filed a cross-bill
seeking an absolute divorce on the ground of more than
five years' voluntary separation. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's granting the wife the divorce,
finding that the separation was not voluntary as to her
but that the husband had wilfully deserted the wife for
more than the statutory period. The Court stated the
problem to be merely that whether the separation was
voluntary as to both, in which case the husband was entitled to the divorce, or involuntary as to the wife, in which
case (a clear case of desertion by him being otherwise
made out) she was entitled to the divorce.
The Court found on the facts that the separation was
involuntary as to the wife, the husband having left for
trivial causes found not sufficient to justify his leaving.
The statement by the wife upon his threat to leave: "Well
- Ibid, 176 Md. 826.
* 178 Md. 12, 11 A. (2d) 630 (1940).
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if you want to go, go on and go, but you are going to have
take care of these children" was said to be not sufficient
to make the separation voluntary as to her. Most of the
discussion was as to the matter of desertion by the husband
(on which the wife's voluntariness is, of course, significant)
and in its brief treatment of the five year separation
ground, in the course of affirming the dismissal of the
husband's cross-bill, the Court said: ". . . if the original
separation was involuntary as to her, and so remained
throughout its duration, that statute has no application."' 0
It might be here remarked, particularly because a citation
of the Campbell case followed the quoted language, that
the Court was impliedly reiterating that case's ruling that
a separation not voluntary as to both at its beginning may
later become voluntary as to both so as to entitle to a
divorce after five years' continuance of that voluntariness.
It might also be stated that the quoted matter possesses
negative implications to the effect that, when a separation
begins as voluntary on the part of one and involuntary on
the part of the other, all that is required for its later becoming voluntary as to both is that the latter spouse shall
manifest willingness in some fashion, not necessarily requiring concerted action with the former one.
In Kline v. Kline," somewhat the same clash was involved as in the Miller case. The husband sued, alleging
five years' voluntary separation, the wife cross-billed alleging desertion by the husband, the trial court granted the
wife the divorce, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding
the separation not voluntary as to the wife, thus precluding
the separation statute from applying, but finding that the
husband had deserted the wife, against her will, thus entitling her to the divorce for that reason. The Court gave
but little treatment to the separation ground, but found
that the wife had "begged him a million times" to live
with her again and that this indicated that the separation
was involuntary as to her. The Court stated that the
word "voluntary" signifies willingness, so that the statute
requires an agreement of the parties to live apart. When
used with reference to a common act of two or more
persons affecting their common relationship, it means that
they acted in willing concert in the doing of the act.
1l Ibid,
"

178 Md. 23.
179 Md. 10, 16 A. (2d) 924 (1940).
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II
Turning now to the two cases under review, it might
be stated as the opinion of the present writer that the
Nichols case is much the sounder of the two, while the
Beck case is dubious, both in its language and in its conclusion. 1 2 Mentioning the Nichols case first at the moment,
it would seem obvious, for two different reasons, that the
separation was not voluntary as to the wife at any time
more than five years prior to the filing of the husband's
suit. The only possible external act of hers indicative of
voluntariness was the alleged agreement in June to separate in the future. But that agreement itself was upon
a condition not performed, her admission to the old ladies'
home. In effect, that was an agreement to separate if
provision were made for her care and support. We can
generalize from the case to the effect that voluntariness
cannot be spelled out from an agreement to separate if
it is conditioned upon provision for the support of the
wife, and if that condition be breached. There would seem
to be no reason why a "voluntariness" cannot be conditional, particularly since our Court interprets the word
"voluntary" to import agreement, and the law is long
familiar with conditional agreements.
On the other hand, had the condition been performed,
then the conclusion should have been that the separation
was voluntary. While agreements of spouses to separate
in the future may have had some trouble at common law
as to their validity because of public policy, yet the broad
terms of the 1931 Maryland statute' s about separation
agreements would probably render them generally valid
so that, if any conditions be performed, they could be the
source of voluntariness, under the divorce statute.
But, if a condition be unperformed, then, as the Nichols
case indicates, such an agreement loses significance on
the matter of the voluntariness of the spouse in whose
favor the condition operates, and such voluntariness must
be sought elsewhere to be superimposed upon any separation of the spouses which may be alleged as ground for
divorce. And no such other source of voluntariness was
1 Over and above the points to be made herein, infra, concerning the
Beck case, it might be observed here that the opinion is overly brief considering the importance of the point and the impact of the ruling on the
losing party; and that it contains an erroneous statement of fact, 24 A.
(2d) 296, as to where the son obtained his legal education. This was correctly stated in the trial court opinion.
" Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 42.
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to be found in the Nichols case. But for their tentative
agreement to separate, immaterial because of failure of
condition precedent, the circumstances of his leaving in
October were such as to make him a deserter, against her
will (her laying out his clothes was held insufficient to
show her agreement to his leaving), particularly as he
made no provision for an otherwise destitute wife.
Not only was there absent anything indicative of voluntariness on the part of the wife, but there was present (and
within the five year period prior to suit) a positive factor
indicative of involuntariness on her part, i. e., her filing a
suit in December, 1936, for a divorce a mensa et thoro.
Both in this case and in the Campbell case it is recognized
that filing a divorce suit alleging the other's desertion
indicates that, as to the then plaintiff, the separation is
(not yet) voluntary. Of course, it might be argued that
seeking (at least an absolute) divorce for desertion indicates that the plaintiff is now willing to live separate, but
the theory of the desertion ground is that the separation
is against the will of the plaintiff, at least up to the time
of filing suit, or up to the end of the statutory period.
Whereas in the Campbell case it was found that the
separation later became voluntary as to the erstwhile plaintiff, that was out of the question in the Nichols case because, even if it had so become (there was nothing so to
indicate) the time would have been too recent, as the
abortive a mensa case itself had been filed by Mrs. Nichols
within five years of the husband's suit.
With reference to the problem whether a separation
originally not voluntary as to both parties may later become so, as was decided in the Campbell case and reiterated
in others, certain language in the Nichols opinion must
be read carefully in the light of the actual facts. There
is the statement that the plaintiff "must prove that the
separation between him and the defendant, which took
place on October 18th, 1936, was mutually voluntary as
of that date." This merely means that, on the facts of this
particularcase, it was necessary that the separation should
have been voluntary as to both on the very day it occurred
(or really within four days thereafter), as the husband's
bill was filed five years and four days after the date of
the separation. In fact, a later part of the Nichols opinion,
in properly distinguishing the Campbell case, reiterated
the doctrine of that case that a separation originally involuntary as to one may become voluntary as to both
later so that, five years after the beginning of the volun-
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tariness, a divorce may be secured. The rule thus still
stands that the separation need not be voluntary as to
both from the first moment of the physical separation.
Because of the time factor in the Nichols case, that separation had to be voluntary when it occurred, or never, as
the facts indicated. There was no time for subsequent
acquiescence.
III
But this proposition, so well established, and reiterated
in the latest Nichols case, that the voluntariness may begin
after the separation begins, seems impliedly to have been
overlooked in the earlier Beck case, the other one here
under review, which case is best described as sui generis.
For its conclusion seems to be based upon the paradoxical
principle that a deserted wife herself becomes a deserter
by moving further away from the erstwhile deserting husband, despite that he does nothing overt to terminate his
desertion of her.
That is the only conclusion one can draw from the
dogmatic statement: "The first abandonment was by the
husband; the second was the act of the wife." This referred, respectively, to the husband's moving to the bedroom of the son, and the wife's moving to other quarters
six months later. Under the Maryland law of desertion
and abandonment, which recognizes that denial of sexual
intercourse is a constructive abandonment, 4 if the husband
was a deserter when he moved to the separate bedroom,
it was because he then intentionally (voluntarily) wished
to cease living with his wife, although, if he was in law
a deserter, the theory is that his thus leaving was against
the wishes of the wife. Thus the Court indicates that the
separation, at least for the six months she remained under
the same roof, was involuntary as to her.
But, why did not the separation become voluntary as
to her when, six months after he moved to a separate
bedroom, himself a deserter, she accepted the situation and
completely removed herself from the premises. If she
did "abandon" him by leaving the house, as the Court
said, does she not ipso facto assent to separation. Part
and parcel of abandonment as it has been spelled out under
the older divorce ground of that name is that the separa14
As decided in Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630, 110 A. 889 (1920) ; Ruckle
v. Ruckle, 141 Md. 207, 118 A. 472 (1922) ; and many cases since those.
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15
tion shall be voluntary as to the abandoning spouse.
imor
insanity
There are dicta, at least, to the effect that
prisonment stops the running of a period of desertion not
no longer be wilful (volyet complete because it then can
16
untary) as to the defendant.
Nothing overt on the part of the husband occurred to
put an end to his (voluntary) abandonment of her which
he committed by moving to a separate room. Disregarding
the anomaly of the word 'abandonment' as used by the
Court of Appeals in this connection, 7 could this be other
than a "husband and wife [who] have voluntarily lived
separate and apart.""' Can one spouse do acts which would
otherwise amount to desertion, which are acquiesced in
by the other, and be heard in a court of equity and conscience to plead that the separation was not voluntary?
Clearly, a plaintiff who brings suit under this statute admits consent. Clearly, a defendant can defeat the action
by proving lack of consent on his part. 9 But may the
defendant, guilty of desertion, defend the suit by proving
that the separation was forced on the plaintiff without
contractualconsent? Is the statute designed thus to assist
a wrong-doer? The Maryland courts, both trial and appellate, until the present case, have held that it was not.
In a lower court case, Mooyer v. Mooyer ° the only finding
which the court deemed necessary was that the separation
be voluntary as to the defendant, and beyond reasonable
expectation of reconciliation. So finding, it granted the
divorce. In Campbell v. Campbell2 ' the Court ruled that
whereas the original act of separation may have been involuntary on the part of the defendant, that nevertheless,
she had subsequently consented (by a tacit recognition
of a prior agreement) to the living apart, and the divorce
See infra, n. 17.
See Noellert v. Noellert, 169 Md. 559, 182 A. 427 (1935).
" It is well established that desertion and abandonment require that the
act be done voluntarily and against the consent of the other spouse. Taylor
v. Taylor, 112 Md. 666, 77 A. 133 (1910) ; Buckner v. Buckner, 118 Md. 101,
84 A. 156, Ann. Cas. 1914B 628 (1912) ; Klein v. Klein, 146 Md. 27, 125 A.
728 (1924) ; Irr v. Irr, 150 Md. 313, 133 A. 56 (1926) ; Daiger v. Daiger,
154 Md. 501, 140 A. 717 (1928); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 156 Md. 656, 145 A.
180 (1929) ; Boyd v. Boyd, 177 Md. 687; 11 A. (2d) 461 (1940).
S Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, See. 40.
" As in France v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., supra, n. 7; Miller v.
Miller, 8upra, n. 9; Kline v. Kline, supra, n. 11; Riland v. Riland, Baltimore Daily Record, April 10, 1941 (Ct. Ct. No. 2, Balto. City, per Frank, J.).
soBaltimore Daily Record, March 9, 1939 (Ct. Ct. Balto. County, per
Lawrence, J.).
22 Supra, n.

8.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

was granted. In France v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.22
the decision was that there never had been a consent by
the defendant to living apart as contemplated by the statute
and accordingly there was no divorce granted. In Miller
v. Miller2 3 and Kline v. Kline2 4 the findings were that the
defendants had not consented. So it was in the lower
court case of Riland v. Riland.2 5 Relief was refused in
these cases.
This interpretation, consistently followed since the inception of the statute, has given remedy to the social and
economic situation which the legislature desired to alleviate. However, this policy would seem to be completely
overridden by the opinion in the Beck case. It states that
a voluntary separation is a prerequisite, necessitating contractualconsent.2 6 This conclusion is contrary to the words
of the statute, and to the interpretation thereof, as expressed in the leading cases.
The statute provides relief where the parties have "voluntarily lived separate and apart . . ." The adverb "voluntarily", here in dispute, is in modification of the verb
"lived".27 By the literal interpretation, the only requirement is the voluntary living apart for the requisite time,
irrespective of fault at the time of separation. The purpose of the statute was to remedy a social evil, a fait accompli, and not to provide a contractual ground for divorce.
The leading case of Campbell v. Campbell clearly held that
a separation, originating under duress, may subsequently
become voluntary, not necessarily when the parties agree
by contract, but when the party wronged is deemed to have
withdrawn the objection. A recent case, Parks v. Parks,2 8
2

Supra, n. 7.

2S3upra, n. 9.
2S
Supra, n. 11.
25

Supra, n. 19.

21 "The separation to be voluntary, so as to entitle either party after five
years' separation to a divorce, must be founded on an agreement to separate and live apart." 24 A. (2d) 296 (italics supplied).
Compare this with the statement in Campbell v. Campbell, supra, n. 3,
which concerns itself only with the volition of the defendant: "While the
plaintiff was responsible for the original separation, . . . we are unable to
hold, in view of the defendant's long continued recognition and dependence
upon the agreement, that the separation therein referred to was involuntary during the whole of the twelve-year period which has elapsed since It
was executed." 174 Md. 229, 239 (italics supplied).
27 See (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 357, 362, discussing the Campbell case along
the line that the statute merely requires that the parties shall have "voluntarily lived separate and apart" and does not require that they shall have
"voluntarily separated".
211116 F. (2d) 556 (C.A. D. C., 1940).
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predicated on a similar statute in the District of Columbia"9
supports this interpretation of the Campbell case and very
succinctly states the reasons therefor:
"The separation was not at first voluntary on the defendant's part; when the plaintiff deserted her, she
begged him not to go. But from that time on she
neither asked him to return nor made any other attempt to bring about a reconciliation. It is perhaps a
fair inference that she reconciled herself to separation.
But that, we think, is not the question. Even if she
did, in fact, wish her husband to return, in the course
of time her silent acquiescence in the separationmade
it voluntary in the statutory sense.... The liberal
purpose of the 1935 amendment points to this construction. That purpose was to permit termination in law
of certain marriages which have ceased to exist in fact.
This is such a marriage. We think the defendant's
silent acquiescence made the separation voluntary, in
the statutory sense, within less than a year after it
began, and therefor more than five years before the
plaintiff filed this suit....
"The fact that the separation resulted from the husband's fault is no defense, since the statute does not
require that the separation originate in any particular
way. [Citing Campbell v. Campbell, supra, among
other cases.] It requires only that for five consecutive
years the separation be voluntary" (italics supplied).
The cases, and the statute itself, should have precluded
the Court of Appeals from injecting the requirement of a
contract into the divorce statute. The Court has translated
the statutory "voluntarily" so as to make it mean "agreement" in the sense of "making a contract" when, at most,
it should mean the state of being agreeable to the situation.
In the instant case, the Court, in quoting from France
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. to the effect that "'voluntary'
connotes an agreement", has entirely misplaced the emphasis of that statement. It was there used to vindicate
the rights of a defendant who was contending that the
separation was, as to her, involuntary. If a defendant
spouse has committed no wrong, any permanent separation is involuntary, unless there is "agreement" to it. But
29 D. C. Code, Supp. V, Title 14, Sec. 63, providing as ground for absolute
divorce: "voluntary separation from bed and board for five consecutive
years without cohabitation".
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certainly it is not necessary that there be a "meeting of
the minds" or contractual undertaking. There may be a
tacit "consent" (which would seem more proper in this
connection than "agreement") or the failure to pursue the
erring spouse with offers of reconciliation, which, in some
cases, might conceivably imply consent.8 0
There are two possible arguments in opposition; that
divorces may be promiscuously granted at the desire of the
parties; or if not at the desire of both, then there is an
adequate remedy under the "misconduct" provisions. The
first argument is completely answered by the raison d'etre
of the statute. In the interest of social benefit, a husband
and wife, separated for five consecutive years, without
other ground for divorce in favor of either one should be
relieved of their marital burden. As prerequisites, the
court must find the five years of voluntary separation and
the futility of reconciliation. If we accept, as we must,
the premise upon which the statute is founded, we serve
only to defeat its purpose by limiting it to contractual separation.
Nor is there sound reason to refuse relief under this
statute simply because there may be other grounds for divorce based on misconduct. Where a spouse has two different grounds for divorce, either one may be relied upon.
There are also sound reasons why a plaintiff, who has been
deserted or otherwise wronged, should be allowed to sustain suit under this statute, without inquiry as to the
plaintiff's state of mind at the time of separation or during
its continuance. Obviously, the social status is dissolved
which the legislature intended should be dissolved, viz.,
one where a husband and wife have for five years lived
separate and apart and without reasonable hope of reconciliation. Secondly, the plaintiff in bringing the action
admits consent. If relief were refused on the ground that
the defendant had deserted, would not the defendant be
able to defend an action charging that desertion by the admission of consent? The question is at least debatable.
Thirdly, proof is always a difficult burden in a divorce case.
Should not the plaintiff be allowed to choose that ground
for divorce which can best be proven? And further, is it
not in the social interest to allow suit for divorce to be
SOSee Mooyer v. Mooyer, supra, n. 20; Parks v. Parks, supra, n. 28; and
Chabeaux v. Chabeaux, 164 Md. 370, 165 A. 301 (1933) which regarded the
failure to make offer of reconciliation after a separation by mutual consent
as indicative of the continuance of that consent so as to debar a divorce
for desertion and abandonment.
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maintained upon the ground which will result in the minimum of scandal and publicity?
The instant case has presented us with an amazing dual
desertion. Resolving this to the realm of possibility, if the
Court had found that the plaintiff was a deserter, the result, refusal of the divorce, would unquestionably be correct. If the defendant is found to be a deserter, it is submitted that a divorce should have been granted, since the
plaintiff has admitted her consent not only by bringing
the action, but also by allowing the separation to continue
for such a long period (9 years) with her apparent approval.
This idea of tacit consent without any contractual
agreement is not a new one under our statute, even though
it would seem to be overruled here. As a matter of fact
it is the very crux of the holding in Campbell v. Campbell,
the leading case. For in that case, disregarding the separation agreement, the wife successfully defended an action
for divorce in 1928 based on the charge of desertion by
contending that the separation was voluntary as to the
husband.
After 9 years, the husband again sued, this time under
the "voluntary separation" statute, and without apparent
difficulty reversed his position from that assumed in 1928.
The wife, defending, reversed her prior position. There
had been no agreement or understanding of any sort
reached after the 1928 suit. But the Court held that the
mere tacit recognition of, and acquiescence in, the situation as it was known to exist constituted a voluntary living
apart within the statute.
In the Beck case, if the Court finds that the defendant
had deserted his wife in 1930, and that the separation was
recognized by the wife, without any attempted reconciliation or overtures thereto for over ten years, is there not
the very same tacit consent upon which the Campbell case
was based, and more especially if we view the "second desertion", not as a desertion, which it cannot be (the husband still assenting to separation) but as a physical recognition of the state of separation as it existed, and a physical
manifestation of assent thereto.
Legislative intent and expression, and subsequent construction and interpretation by the courts make it incumbent upon the courts to find three facts present in order to
grant a divorce under this statute. They must find that
the separation has continued for the five years preceding
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the filing of the bill, that there is no reasonable expectation
of reconciliation, and that the separation is voluntary. To
further impose the necessity of a "contractual" living apart
is an unwarranted attempt at judicial legislation, contrary
to the whole purpose of the statute, and also a clear departure from the rule of the much better reasoned Campbell case (itself reiterated by dictum in the latest Nichols
case) that tacit acquiescence after separation otherwise
begun is all that is necessary for the statute to apply.
It is not consonant with the realities to say that the voluntariness need not coincide with the beginning of the
separation, but may come later, and still to require contractual agreement by way of a separation agreement or
other contractual activity in order to spell out that subsequently arising voluntariness. Spouses who have drifted
apart do not gather around a table much later to put their
affairs in order for a divorce five years thence.
It is submitted that the unfortunate implications of the
Beck case should either be overruled or forgotten by the
Court of Appeals, to the end that the legislative intent in
passing the statute and the proper interpretation of it in
the Campbell case may be carried out. To do otherwise
would be to pervert the meaning of the statute.
IV
Those who delight to speculate concerning the "secret
equities" and "off the record" aspects of decided cases have
an interesting opportunity to apply their techniques to the
series of seven cases in which the Maryland Court of Appeals has had occasion to deal with the five-year separation
ground. Only in the Campbell case was a divorce granted
for that ground. In all the other six cases the ground was
held inapplicable. Let us approach these seven cases first
from the standpoint of the impact of the rulings on the
personal interests of the parties (capacity to marry others),
and then from the angle of the impact on the economic
standing of the respective wives (alimony and support).
Looking at them from the standpoint of the personal
interests of the parties, we see that the Campbell case alone
granted the divorce on this ground. Of the six where the
five-year ground was held inapplicable, however, the parties were divorced a vinculo for other reasons in the Dotterweich, Miller, and Kline cases. Of the remaining three,
the personal aspects had become moot through divorce by
the Grim Reaper himself in the France case, pending the
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legal divorce case. One suspects that personal interests
were the less significant consideration at stake in the
Nichols case, where the spouses were both due to reach the
age of eighty in the same year as the Court of Appeals ruling. Finally, even in the Beck case, the Court intimated
that one or the other of the parties might be entitled to an
a vinculo divorce for abandonment if properly sought and
pleaded. What all this proves is left to the reader's speculation.
Let us now consider the impact of these seven rulings
on the economic status of the respective wives. Let it be
remembered by way of introduction that it is not yet clear
under the statute whether a wife is entitled to permanent
alimony when a divorce is granted for the 'five year ground
and that the Court of Appeals has never had to face that
issue squarelys' (contractual support in the Campbell
case; question moot by death of husband in France case;
also moot in that case and in all the others by denial of
divorce on the particular ground).
In the Campbell case, where the divorce was granted
for this ground, support for the wife nevertheless resulted
because of an agreement worded to survive divorce. In
the Miller and Kline cases the husbands obtained personal
relief from the chains of matrimony, but at the price of
being ordered to pay permanent alimony to their wives,
awarded on the stabler basis of the orthodox abandonment
ground, without having to go into the question, does alimony follow for separation as a ground. Denying the divorce in the France case guaranteed the wife (thus reinstated as widow) her statutory portion and dower in the
(already) deceased husband's (considerable) property.
Denying it in the Nichols case not only preserves the wife's
inchoate claims to his property should she survive him, but
permits her to seek support inter vivos for his desertion of
her which the Court (in the abstract) declared to have
happened. In the Dotterweich case, the wife's own misconduct precluded her from being entitled to support by
her husband; and in the Beck case the wife was not seeking
it, was in fact self supporting, and sought to be divorced
without support from the husband. Here, too, the reader
is left to speculate as to the particular coincidences which
seem to be involved.
3" See (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 357, 360, marshalling the arguments pro and
con on the alimony point. See Ibid, 361 concerning another point, still
undecided under the separation ground, whether the plaintiff's recriminatory misconduct will bar him from a divorce.

